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DESIGN-BUILD CONTRACTS IN VIRGINIA
Construction law is a varied and intricate outgrowth of the innumer-
able complex relationships inherent in any building project. The role of
the architect,1 once the master builder, has undergone and continues to
undergo a redefinition. Due to recent changes in the construction indus-
try, especially the development of construction management and design-
1. While philosophical distinctions may be drawn between the meaning of the terms
"architect" and "engineer" there is little practical significance to such distinctions. It is gen-
erally agreed that though architects are generally employed in residential or commercial
construction, whereas engineers are generally employed on industrial or public utility
projects, both may perform design and supervision functions, and where one entity performs
both functions the label "architect" or "engineer" is irrelevant to the outcome of the case. C.
DUNHAM & R. YOUNG, CONTRACTS, SPECIFICATIONS, AND LAW FOR ENGINEERS 111, 384 (2d ed.
1971).
Concurring, another commentator noted that while the majority of tort liability cases in-
volve architects "in practically all situations, the word engineer could be substituted for
architect when an engineer is furnishing similar service." Bell, Professional Negligence of
Architects and Engineers, 12 VAND. L. REv. 711, 712 (1959).
Thus the impact of design-build concepts is of equal relevance to engineers in Virginia
where the statutes fail to make any substantial distinction between "architects" and
"engineers."
§ 54-17.1. Definitions. - The following terms, as used in this chapter, shall
have the meaning given in this section:
(1)(a) "Architect" means a person who, by reason of his knowledge of the mathe-
matical and physical sciences, and the principles of architecture and architectural
design, acquired by professional education, practical experience, or both, is qualified
to engage in the practice of architecture as attested by his licensing as an architect.
(b) "Practice of architecture" shall mean any service wherein the principles and
methods of architecture are applied, such as consultation, investigation, evaluation,
planning, design, including responsible administration of construction contracts, in
connection with any private or public buildings, structures or projects, or the equip-
ment thereof, or the accessories thereto.
(2)(a) "Professional engineer" shall be deemed to mean a person who is qualified
to practice engineering by reason of his special knowledge and use of mathematical,
physical and engineering sciences and the principles and methods of engineering
analysis and design acquired by engineering education and experience; and who has
complied with the requirements for licensing as set forth in § 54-27.
(b) The "practice of engineering" shall mean any service wherein the principles
and methods of engineering are applied to, but are not necessarily limited to, the
following areas: consultation, investigation, evaluation, planning and design of public
or private utilities, structures, machines, equipment, processes, transportation sys-
tems and work systems, including responsible administration of construction
contracts.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-17.1 (Repl. VoL 1978).
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build concepts, the regulatory framework within which the building pro-
ject operates is, in many states, in need of reform. The purpose of this
comment will be to examine the impact of the development of design-
build concepts on the traditional model of owner, architect, and contrac-
tor relationships and to discern the feasibility of the design-build concept
under existing Virginia law.
I. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
No one model can satisfactorily describe the interaction between own-
er, architect and contractor. The responsibilities of each party are set out
in contract agreements which may vary depending upon the parties in-
volved and/or the character of the building project.2 Under the traditional
model a triangular relationship existed by virtue of the owner's separate
contracts with the contractor and the architect and by assigning in both
contracts supervisory responsibility to the architect.' The architect inter-
preted contract documents, certified the sufficiency of the contractor's
performance, served as the channel of communication between the owner
and the contractor, and arbitrated any disputes which may have arisen.4
In addition, the architect owed a fiduciary duty to his client, who relied
upon the architect's professional skill to represent his best interest and
insure the quality of the work done by the contractor.'
The traditional model is no longer universally appropriate. "In compar-
atively recent times this concept has been fragmented. No one person is
now in charge of the project from conception to completion. . . and the
architect is primarily retained to provide the design for a proposed pro-
ject and to lend his assistance in its implementation."
2. Traditionally the architect was the master builder. Michaelangelo and Leonardo da
Vinci are the prototypes of the omniscient master builder who was charged with responsi-
bility for the total success of a construction project. In this role the architect not only graph-
ically portrayed the basic concept of the aesthetic and structural components of an edifice,
he also took charge of its implementation, and was liable for its failure.
Kahn, Introduction: The Changing Role of the Architect, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 216 (1979).
3. Sweet, Owner-Architect-Contractor: Another Eternal Triangle, 47 CALIF. L. RaV. 645
(1959). "The AIA General Conditions, past and present, has expressly provided that nothing
in the contract documents creates a contractual relationship between the architect and con-
tractors. The courts have agreed with this interpretation." Davidson, The Liability of Archi-
tects, 13 TRIAL 20, 22 (June 1977).
4. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, DOCUMENT A201, THE GE RAL CoNI-
TIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS, art. 38 (9th ed. 1963) [herein-
after cited as AIA, GENERAL CONDITIONS].
5. C. DUNHAM & R. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 4.
6. Kahn, supra note 2, at 216.
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The redu6ed role of the architect is attributable to many factors -
legal, economic and technological. Several legal factors have combined to
increase the architect's susceptibility to third party suits.7 One such fac-
tor was the removal of privity as a requirement to sue the architect.8
When the doctrine of privity was rejected, the architect was no longer
insulated from third party liability for negligent performance of his con-
tractual duties.9 The courts began to reinterpret the scope of the archi-
tect's duty under the owner-architect agreement, especially with regard
to the architect's duty to supervise the construction of the building pro-
ject.10 The architect became increasingly susceptible to liability not only
to the owner, but also to third parties injured at the work site,1 sureties12
7. It has been estimated that architectural malpractice suits have been increasing at the
rate of 20% each year and that 29.6% of insured architects or engineering firms were sued
in 1976. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
8. "The earlier decisions ... freed the architect of responsibility once the structure had
been completed and turned over to the owner. This was accomplished by applying the priv-
ity of contract doctrine to bar suits by an injured third party against the architect. . ."
Crisham, Liability of Architects and Engineers to Third Parties, 26 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q.
177, 179 (1976).
The doctrine of privity had its origin in the English common law in Winterbottom v.
Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) where the driver of coach which lost a wheel and
overturned could not sue defendant since defendant's contract to maintain the coach in
proper repair was with one other than the plaintiff, hence there was no privity. As a result,
the court required the plaintiff to prove not only the elements of negligence but also the
"existence of a legally recognized relationship, or privity, with the defendant." See Note,
Liability of Design Professionals - The Necessity of Fault, 58 IOWA L. REv. 1221, 1222
(1973).
The doctrine endured in construction law long after it ceased to have any vitality in other
legal contexts. This is evidenced by its use in relation to architects and engineers in cases as
late as 1965. E.g., Peyronnin Constr. Co. v. Weiss, 137 Ind. App. 417, 427-29, 208 N.E.2d
489, 494-95 (1965). See 2 F. HiARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.5 (1956).
9. Inman v. Binghampton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699, 143 N.E.2d 895
(1957) is generally recognized as the leading case in the assault on the doctrine of privity
with respect to architects.
10. "The greatest growth of claims by third parties against architects seems to be arising
out of contracts or agreements between the architect and the owner to provide supervision
or general administration of the structure or project which the architect designed and
planned." Crisham, supra note 8, at 184.
11. In the early 1900's, courts had consistently held that a supervising architect was only
responsible for the results of a project and that there was no duty to supervise the methods
or manner of construction to inspect for safety. E.g., Clinton v. Boehm, 139 A.D. 73, 124
N.Y.S. 789, 791 (1910) (where, according to the owner-architect contract, the architects were
to "superintend the construction and erection" of the building). This, however, is no longer
the case as courts have imposed varying degrees of supervisory responsibility upon archi-
tects. In recent years some courts have gone so far as to impose liability for third party
injury at the construction site based upon a provision in the architect-owner agreement giv-
ing the architect the right to halt construction. See Miller v. Dewitt, 59 Ill. App 2d 38, _
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and contractors' s via the court's interpretation of the architect's super-
226 N.E.2d 630, 638 (1967), rev'g, 37 IMI. 2d 273, 208 N.E.2d 249 (1965), where the court
stated:
[Ulnder the terms of the contracts the architects had the right to interfere and even
stop the work if the contractor began to [perform] in an unsafe and hazardous man-
ner in violation of its contract with the owner .... We agree with the architects that
they had no duty to specify the method the contractor would use. . ., but ... the
architects had the right to insist upon a safe and adequate use of that method.
... [W]e conclude that if the architects knew or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known that the [manner of construction] was inadequate and unsafe,
they had the right and corresponding duty to stop the work until the unsafe condi-
tion had been remedied. If the architects breached such a duty they would be
liable....
(Citation omitted). Contra, Reber v. Chandler High School Dist. No. 202, 13 Ariz. App. 133,
474 P.2d 852 (1970) (expressly rejecting the Miller rationale). It should be noted that the
Miller decision could just as well have been based upon the Illinois Structural Work Act,
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48 §§ 60-69 (1973). Miller, 59 IMI. App. 2d at 125, 226 N.E.2d at 639.
Referred to as the "Scaffold Act," it is "similar in content if not [in] name to statutes found
in other states ... [and] places a non-delegable duty upon . . . [those] 'having charge of'
construction work to see that ladders, scaffolds, cranes, hoists, stays, supports and other
mechanical contrivances are safely and properly placed, set, erected and operated."
Crisham, supra note 8, at 190-91. Here again, the court used the contract provision for
general construction supervision to hold the architect as one "having charge of" construc-
tion and therefore liable. See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 869 (1974 and Supp.).
12. Most of the cases holding an architect liable to an insurance company have done so on
the basis of the architect's incorrect certification of payments to the contractor, fol-
lowed by the contractor's default...
... Such a default places the burden on the seller of the contractor's performance
bond to complete the project and absorb whatever loss was incurred by the owners'
overpayment. The insurance company may then try to recover its losses from the
architect on a theory of negligent certification of partial payments.
Merritt, Up Against the Wall, Master Builder: The Architect's Legal Status, 23 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 384, 411-12 (1979) (citations omitted).
In line with these cases are decisions in which the architect is held liable to the surety
company based upon his negligent supervision of the contractor's negligent construction.
The architect has been held liable in certain cases despite his expression of disapproval
prior to the negligent construction.
In Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum Inc., 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1968) the
architect was held liable for losses incurred by the surety company in rebuilding a retaining
wall which had been improperly constructed despite evidence that the architect had in-
formed the contractor of misaligned forms and told him that the work would be rejected.
"The case is disconcerting because no court would have held the architect liable to the con-
tractor in such a situation." Merritt, supra, at 413.
13. Interpretation of the architect's duty to supervise construction has been carried to its
extreme in allowing the contractor to recover. In United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F.
Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958) the contractor had failed to use concrete of the specified quality,
after which the architect had authorized the incorporation of bents (pre-formed structures
which are hoisted into place to form the skeleton of the building). The architect was held
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visory function under the architect-owner agreement.
A direct result of this liability has been "regular modification and re-
drafting of the standard form owner-architect agreements... as an at-
tempt on the part of the architect to insulate himself from responsibility"
for construction means, methods, techniques or safety precautions used
by contractors.1 ' "Too few lawsuits arising under the twelfth (1970) and
thirteenth (1976) editions of AIA General Condition" have reached
appellate courts to elucidate whether the pattern of liability for 'con-
struction administration' is changing."1 6 Commentators, however, have
strongly suggested that this pattern of liability is not changing and, fur-
thermore, should not change.17 It must be emphasized that while courts
have often declined to impose such liability upon the architect, the in-
crease in the scope of potential liability is a factor which has contributed
significantly to the general trend in which the architect has surrendered
much of his former authority regarding construction administration and
supervision to the owner.
liable for losses incurred by the contractor in removing and repouring the concrete. Merritt,
supra note 12, at 410.
14. Crisham, supra note 8, at 185. The term "general supervision and the direction of the
work" was deleted from the standard form owner-architect agreement after the seventh
(1958) edition of the American Institute of Architects, Document A201, The General Condi-
tions of the Contract for Construction of Buildings. Davidson, supra note 3, at 23.
Consequently, the AIA, General Conditions, from the ninth (1963) edition onward,
has provided simply that the architect 'will make periodic visits to the site to famil-
iarize himself generally with the progress and quality of the work and to determine in
general if this work is proceeding in accordance with the contract documents' and
that 'he will not be required to make exhaustive or continuous onsite inspections to
check the quality or quantity of the work and he will not be responsible for the con-
tractor's failure to carry out the construction work in accordance with the contract
documents.' The eleventh (1967) edition added the language that the architect 'will
not have control or charge of construction means, methods, techniques, sequences of
procedure, or for-safety precautions and programs in connection with the work. But
not until the twelfth (1970) edition did the architect abandon the right to stop the
work.
Id. at 24.
15. AIA, GENERAL CONDMONS supra note 14.
16. Davidson, supra note 3, at 24.
17. "However, further examination of the current thirteenth (1976) edition of AIA, Gen-
eral Conditions would suggest that [the pattern of liability] should not be, and, is not chang-
ing." Id.; "In spite of the lengthening of the clause and the shortening of the duties and
whether it is called 'supervision,' 'inspection,' 'administration,' 'casual observation' or even
'a glance,' the architect does owe some duty.. ." which is not relieved bypttempted dis-
claimers. Goodin, Architects and Malpractice, 34 Ins. Counsel J. 290, 292 (1967); Kornblut,
Document A201 Strives to Clarify - Not Change - The Roles of Architect, Contractor and
Owner, 161 AncHrrEcTurAL REcoRD 67 (April 1977).
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Economic and technological factors have also served to reduce the vi-
tality of the traditional model. Under the traditional model, the owner
first hires an architect to develop a schematic design of the building pro-
ject, reduce that design to a set of detailed drawings and produce a set of
construction documents from which the building will be constructed."8
The owner then selects a contractor, the selection process being con-
ducted in any number of ways.19 After the owner has selected a contrac-
tor, the actual erection of the building may begin.
As numerous commentators have noted, this process is time consuming
and inadequate to meet the needs of the modern institutional client.2 0
Construction cannot begin until after all the plans and specifications have
been finished.21 This delay renders the owner vulnerable to a wide range
18. Schematic design... consists of studying the project requirements and establishing
basic design concepts....
When the schematic design is resolved and agreed to by the owner... the de-
signer begins to reduce the schematic design to detailed drawings ....
The final design stage consists of the production of construction documents from
which the building will be built....
When the architect has completed the construction document stage he will have
generated a complete set of drawings ['plans'] and specifications ['specs']. The
drawings are highly stylized graphic representations which describe what the
parts of the building look like, what their dimensions are, and how they are to
fit together... A set of 'specs' is ordinarily bound in book form and may be
several hundred pages in length.
Note, Preface to Traditional Relationships on the Building Project, 23 ST. Louis L.J. 205,
208-13 (1979).
19. A contractor may be selected either by competitive bidding or through private negoti-
ation except on public projects in which case the contractor is always chosen on the basis of
the competitive bidding procedures provided under appropriate state or federal statutes or
regulations. Carey, Assessing Liability of Architects and Engineers for Construction Super-
vision, INS. L.J., March 1979, at 147.
To bid the job, the contractor obtains a set of plans and specs .... He then calcu-
lates the quantities [and cost] of different materials required and the estimated labor
to install them .... Finally, the contractor will add in overhead, local, state and fed-
eral taxes, multiply by a safety factor and profit margin and derive a price at which
he is willing to bid the job.
Note, supra note 18, at 212-13.
20. See J. SwEL-, LEGAL ASPEcTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION
PROCESS 245 (2d ed. 1977); AMERicAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, DasIGN-BuiD-Bm: AN
OwNER's GUIDE (n.d.).
21. Construction cannot begin until there is a contractor. A contractor is selected on the
basis of his bid, which he can determine only from the final drawings (plans and specs),
Note, supra notes 18-19.
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of unforeseen events which may, individually or collectively, prove dis-
astrous to the building project. There may be delays between the comple-
tion of design and the start of construction. 22 The owner is then increas-
ingly likely to incur cost overruns due to the escalating cost of materials
and labor, the reduced availability of materials and possibly unforeseen
weather delays.23
With the changing character of the owner has come a change in the
nature of his needs. The traditional model envisions the owner as a single
person and the building project as a single building.24 Today, however,
the owner is likely to be a corporate body and the building project a
group of buildings.25 The needs of the modern institutional client have
increased the size and the complexity of both the design and construction
phases of the building project2 6 while combining with other factors to
place a heightened emphasis on cost control and fast construction in to-
day's construction industry.27 With the growth of project types and their
complexity has come the concomitant need for new technology and spe-
cialized skills which the architect is not always qualified to provide.28 As
architectural education has lagged behind the changes in the construction
22. [S]everal months may elapse between the completion of final design and the start of
construction.
... [A]s more sophisticated factory-fabricated building products enter the market,
the lead time for advance production scheduling and preliminary architectural plan-
ning expands tremendously... [For example] factory-fabricated demountable steel
office partitions, designed to fit a modular floor plan, may require several months'
notice to fit into a manufacturer's production schedule.
C. GRFnFi, DzvLoPNTwr BULDING: THE TEAM APPROACH 14 (1972).
23. Kahn, supra note 2.
24. W. CAumILL, ARcHIrcruRE BY Tm 87 (1971).
25. Id. at 88.
26. Comment, The Roles of Architect and Contractor in Construction Management, 6 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 447, 453 (1973).
27. Inflation in construction and financing costs has placed a premium on speed in the
development process. Once the developer [owner] has decided to build, each month's
delay is a month's lost rent. But, . . . the financial penalties for delay are much
greater than mere loss of income.... By cutting design-construction time from 24 to
18 months, and thereby generating early cash-flow receipts from a building, a devel-
oper may cut his equity cash participation by as much as 30 percent. This cash-in-
vestment reduction increases financial leverage, or profit-equity ratio, and leverage is
the key to financially successful development.
C. GmRFiN, supra note 22, at 15.
28. "The skills which may be required on a project include computer programming and
analysis ... and an understanding of engineering, economics and accounting." Comment,
supra note 26, at 453.
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industry"' the ever widening range of expertise which has become essen-
tial to progress has also contributed to the architect's surrender of
authority.s
II. THE DESIGN-BUILD MODEL
Under the design-build concept,3' the owner has a contract with only
one entity, either the architect or the contractor, as opposed to the trian-
gular relationship under the traditional model.'2 Under the contract the
entity agrees to design and build the desired structure and present the
owner with the finished product. This design-build format is used cur-
rently in European countries as well as by larger American engineering
firms."s
While the design-build format is not suited to every building project, it
is well suited to the needs of institutional clients and the large-scale,
highly specialized building projects they require." As opposed to the
traditional model, it offers a formal mechanism for monitoring and con-
trolling costs at an early stage S5 Under the design-build format, the own-
er develops a functional program for the building project."s The selected
design-build entity then prepares a preliminary design concept and estab-
lishes a time and cost proposal. Upon acceptance by the owner the design
phase proceeds. Thus cost and time parameters are set in the early stages
of the project. In addition, this format provides a manner of delivery in
which phased construction may be utilized. Known as "Fast-Tracking,"'
29. C. GRIFFIN, supra note 22, at 8. "[M]ost architectural offices do not have the expertise
to handle large scale construction problems." Comment, supra note 26, at 457.
30. Davison, supra note 3, at 21.
31. Design-build refers to an agreement with one single entity who provides design and
construction under one contract. The same definition is often given to what is called a
"Turn-Key Contract." While the Turn-Key contract has the above mentioned dimension, it
includes any number of additional services such as land acquisition, financing and leasing.
"In industrial work, the term 'Turn-Key' also very often means that the contractor includes
the installation of the entire manufacturing process, ready for startup and operation by the
owner." ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, BUILDING CONSTRUCTION CON-
TRACTING METHODS: OwNERs GUIDE 9 (n.d.).
32. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
33. J. SwEET, supra note 20, at 699-700.
34. "D & B is best suited for large-scale, specialized work where the design skills are not
diffused but centered in a few organizations. Also it is more appropriate for a sophisticated
owner who has persons with design and administrative skills on its staff." Id. at 245.
35. C. GRIFFIN, supra note 22, at 20.
36. The functional program is a set of requirements which the building must meet.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, supra note 20.
37. "The advantages of this technique vary enormously with the size and type of project.
The concept is most effective and efficient in the case of highly standardized and repetitive
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construction may commence before the plans and specifications are com-
plete,38 thus producing time savings for the entire project.39 Design is per-
formed in phases, and construction commences upon the completion of a
design phase. This procedure permits early ordering of long lead compo-
nents such as steel, 40 which further reduces construction time. As the pro-
ject proceeds the remaining portions of the design are formulated and
completed within the cost parameters set at the beginning of the project.
In this manner, the owners' high priority on cost control and quick con-
struction are facilitated.
Another appealing aspect of this model is the "single-point responsibil-
ity." A single entity is responsible to the owner not only for design and
construction quality but also for adherence to cost and time parameters.41
One of the critical faults of the traditional model is the difficulty in ascer-
taining who is liable when the project fails.42 The builder claims that
faulty design is responsible. The architect claims either faulty construc-
tion is responsible or, where appropriate, a lack of proper supervision. In
the design-build contract the lines of liability are more clearly drawn. The
designer-builder is liable for (1) all injuries incurred at the work site; (2)
any default which may cause a loss to the surety; (3) any failure in design
or construction quality. This has the effect of increasing the scope of lia-
bility for the contractor if he is the contracting entity as he is now liable
for all design faults.
On the other hand, this model is much more favorable to the architect
when he is the contracting entity. The design-build model puts all per-
sons working at the construction site under his employ. Any and all inju-
ries will be compensated for under a workmen's compensation program,
thus relieving the architect of the constant threat of suits by third party
workers over whom he had no control.4 3 Though the architect will un-
buildings types such as office buildings and warehouses." McLaughlin and Ripley, A Partial
Guide to Painless Construction Management Projects, 161 ARCHITECTURAL RECORD, 65
(1979).
38. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text for comparison with the traditional model.
39. See note 27 supra.
40. See note 22 supra.
41. AMERICAN INsTrruTE OF ARCHITECTS, supra note 20.
42. See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text.
43. The employee no longer has a right to sue his employer for injuries incurred while on
the job where the employer has made payment for such injuries according to the workmen's
compensation statute. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1972) as
cited in Note, Liability of Design Professionals - The Necessity of F7ault, 58 IowA L. REv.
1221, 1239 (1973).
Part of the reason for the expansion of the architect's liability and supervisory duty
has stemmed from the condition of the workmen's compensation programs.
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doubtedly be liable in a larger number of cases, his liability will more
accurately reflect his role, both administratively" and financially," in the
building project. Additionally, [i]f there were a default and the bonding
company had to finish the job, "recourse against the architect-builder
would no longer operate as a windfall recovery against [a] relatively
blameless designer. "48
III. DESIGN-BUILD CONTRACTS AND VIRGINIA LAW
Presently in Virginia, there is much concern relating to the impact of
design-build concepts on the state's regulatory framework. 47 A study of
First, payments under such programs are limited to medical expenses incurred and
to fixed amounts for disabling injuries which threaten income.... Second, the em-
ployee relinquishes his common law right to sue his employer for an injury where
payment for damages has been provided by a workmen's compensation statute. How-
ever, the common law right to sue third persons whose negligence proximately caused
the workman's injury [the architect] is retained.
... [W]here workmen's compensation ... benefits are less than the total amount
of damages suffered . . ., there will likely be a search for a reasonably close 'deep
pocket' capable of sustaining the remaining loss.
Id. at 1239.
44. The architect would be more aware of construction supervision, as well as being in a
better position to assure performance. "Since he would buy and assemble the materials him-
self, he would be able to guarantee that the right products were used, and that they were
properly installed." Merritt, supra note 12, at 420-21.
45. There is no longer any "disincentive to design for inexpensive and efficient construc-
tion" as the architect's fee is not based upon a percentage of the final cost of the building.
The architect is now able to derive compensation from the profit on labor and materials
furnished in the building process. The strengthened financial position of the architect allows
"[t]he owner, workers and users of the building [to] look to a person who is both in charge
of the project and financially able to bear the burden of liability." Id. at 421, n.187 and
accompanying text.
46. Id. at 421.
47. A public hearing was held on October 15, 1976 concerning "proposed changes in rules
and regulations of the Virginia State Board of Architects, Professional Engineers and Land
Surveyors as authorized by Chapters 1.1 and 3 of Title 54 of the Code of Virginia." DEPART-
MENT OF COMMERCE, STATEMENT OF BASIS AND PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED RULES AND REGU-
LATIONS OF THE STATE BOARD OF ARCHITECTS, PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS AND LAND SURvEYoRS
PURSUANT TO SECTION a-6.14.7 OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA 22 (1977).
A major part of the substantive conflict in the testimony received . . . revolved
around the implementation of section 1.1 entitled 'Who is Required to Obtain a Li-
cense' and 2.9 'Professional Services Incidental to Other Work on Turn-Key Projects.'
Due to the number of individuals addressing themselves to these two sections and the
concern of the Board as to how these sections deleted from the rules approved, and
tabled for further considerations. An ad hoc committee was appointed for further
study and consideration of legal advice and will report back to the Board .... The
Board specifically is concerned with being able to spell out the nature of a legal turn-
key project and giving the Board some control and restriction over them. The Board
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Virginia licensing statutes and regulations is now in progress.48 This study
is scheduled to be presented to the Virginia General Assembly during the
1981 session and is expected to have a great impact upon the present
regulatory structure concerning architects and engineers. 4'9 The following
analysis will attempt to outline some of the potential conflicts which need
to be resolved if Virginia law is to outline clearly the legality of and the
responsibilities under a design-build contract.50
The design-build model is flexible and allows for different forms of de-
livery of services. Each form presents various problems under present
Virginia licensing statutes. The first format to be examined is one in
which a contractor (builder) contracts to design and build with an owner.
The issue to be resolved is whether a contractor, being a general business
entity, is in violation of Virginia law51 by contracting to provide profes-
sional services for which it has no license.
In addition to rendering the unlicensed practitioner susceptible to
criminal prosecution,52 the violation invalidates the contract and renders
it unenforceable. In Virginia, Massie v. Dudley5s firmly established that
The law refuses to enforce illegal contracts, as a rule, not out of regard for
the party objecting, .. but for reasons of public policy.5 [W]here a licens-
ing statute is a police regulation, having for its object the protection of the
public, making it unlawful for a person to engage in a business without a
is concerned that a proper licensee should be in control of projects undertaken.
Id.
48. Id.
49. According to Robert A. Nebicker, Deputy Director, Department of Commerce, Com-
monwealth of Virginia.
50. In so doing, it should be noted that there are few cases dealing with this topic, none of
which are Virginia cases. Analysis will therefore focus on the rationale behind those cases
and the applicability of those rationales to Virginia law.
51. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, corporation or other entity to
engage in any of the following acts:
A. Practicing a profession or occupation, for the practice of which a license is re-
quired by law or rule of a regulatory board, without holding the requisite valid
license.
Any person, partnership, corporation or other entity who engages in any unlawful
act enumerated in this section shall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.
VA. CODE AN. § 54-1.14 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (repealed and re-enacted as VA. CODE ANN. § 54-
1.20 (Repl. Vol. 1979)). "It shall be unlawful for any person to practice or to offer to practice
the profession of architecture [or] engineering ... in this state ... unless such person has
been duly licensed." VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF ARCHITEcTS, PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS AND
LAND SURvEYoRs, RuLEs AND REGULATIONS § 1.1 (1979).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-1.20, supra note 51.
53. 173 Va. 42, 3 S.E.2d 176 (1939).
54. Id. at 52, 3 S.E.2d at 180.
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license, .... a contract made by an unlicensed person is void and
unenforceable. 5
The court applied this rationale in Clark v. Moore, 6 finding that Clark,
the plaintiff, was unable to recover for services rendered in connection
with Moore's successful bid on a construction project because Clark's ser-
vices amounted to the practice of professional engineering, for which he
had failed to obtain a license.57
While Clark establishes that an unlicensed individual may not contract
to perform the services for which a license is required, the design-build
contract presents for resolution the issue of whether a contract to provide
those services for which a license is required, that is to arrange for those
services to be performed by a duly licensed person, is likewise illegal.
Such was the issue presented in Seaview Hospital, Inc. v. Medicenters
of America, Inc.58 A general contractor sought to recover money allegedly
due under a "Turn-Key contract." 9 While the owner alleged that the
contract was illegal, 0 Texas law expressly provided that "a firm, partner-
ship or a corporation may engage in the practice of architecture,. . . in
this State, provided that such practice is actually carried on, conducted
and performed only by persons to whom registration certificates have
been duly issued. . . ."6e Based upon the statute and the policy behind
the statute the court was persuaded that a contract to "perform" services
is not the same as a contract to "furnish" those services.
The word "furnish" requires a person to provide what is needed and implies
the provision of all essentials for performing a function; the word "perform"
requires a person to carry out a function and implies action by the person in
carrying out by him all essentials necessary to complete the action.
A general contractor, under the licensing statute here involved, is not pre-
cluded from entering into a contract: [sic] with the owner which provides
that the contractor will engage or hire architects who are duly licensed
.... The stated objective of both statutes is to protect public health,
safety and the general welfare by insuring that architectural and engineer-
ing work in this State be performed only by qualified persons who are duly
licensed.62
55. Id. at 53, 3 S.E.2d at 181.
56. Clark v. Moore, 196 Va. 878, 86 S.E.2d 37 (1955).
57. Id. at 881-82, 86 S.E.2d at 39.
58. 570 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
59. See AssOCITD GENERAL CONTRACTORS oF AMERICA, supra note 31.
60. 570 S.W.2d at 35, 37.
61. Id. at 38, quoting Tzx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 249a (Vernon).
62. 570 S.W.2d at 39-40.
DESIGN-BUILD CONTRACTS
The Louisiana Court of Appeals confronted similar circumstances in
West Baton Rouge Parish School Board v. T.R. Ray, Inc.'8 T.R. Ray, Inc.
contracted to perform architectural services for the school board. The ar-
chitect who had prepared the plans and specifications left the employ of
the corporation after construction had begun. Due to the loss of the archi-
tect the school board terminated the contract, and the corporation initi-
ated arbitration proceedings to recover amounts it alleged were due. The
school board sought to enjoin the arbitration, alleging the unenforceabil-
ity of the contract based upon the corporation's practicing architecture
without a license." The court of appeals, adopting a rationale similar to
Seaview, found the contract was valid, stating that:
[t]he general rule is that a corporation can perform any lawful business
activity which has not been prohibited to it or is not governed by special
laws.
... Title 37 is primarily concerned with establishing certain minimum
standards which various professionals must meet before they are licensed to
practice in Louisiana, and not with whether those professions can
incorporate.
... There is no prohibition or specific law governing the providing of pro-
fessional services of an architect, thus we find no bar to T.R. Ray, Inc., a
duly incorporated entity, from providing those services .... 65
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected this rationale, re-
versed the court of appeals and reinstated the injunction granted by the
district court.66 In finding that Louisiana law does not provide for the
delivery of professional architectural services by a non-professional corpo-
ration, the court stated:
Only a person who has been granted a certificate of registration and license
... may practice architecture in the State of Louisiana.
[T]he corporation agreed to perform "professional services" as an archi-
tect ....
... [I]t was legally impossible for [the corporation to be licensed] ...
because a licensee must pass an examination and possess certain moral, le-
gal and educational qualifications. Consequently, the agreement ... was a
contract to perform architectural services unlawfully without a certificate of
63. 361 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 1978), rev'd, 367 So. 2d 332 (La. Sup. Ct. 1979).
64. 361 So. 2d at 300.
65. Id. at 302.
66. West Baton Rouge Parish School Board v. T.R. Ray, Inc., 367 So. 2d 332, 333-34 (La.
Sup. Ct. 1979) rev'g 361 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 1978).
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registration and license
The Virginia courts have yet to examine whether, under the relevant
statutes and regulations governing the construction industry, general bus-
iness corporations may engage in design-build contracting.es The Virginia
Department of Commerce has examined the question, based upon com-
plaints logged alleging such activity, and has apparently decided that
such activities are not a violation of the relevant statutes and regula-
tions.19 However, the basis for this decision has not been articulated by
the Department, and there are indications that this is only an interim
policy, based on anticipated adoption of regulations which are hoped to
he forthcoming from the Department's current study.70
Examination of the traditional model reveals a pronounced reduction
in the architect's supervisory function. This reduction, in conjunction
with the general contractor's expertise in construction techniques and
procedures, has resulted in the transfer of some supervisory responsibili-
ties, traditionally within the architect's province, to the general contrac-
tor.7 1 While some overlap may be inherent in the definition of the func-
tions each is to perform,7 2 without more precise definition of what is to
constitute "architectural services" the controversy over the legality of the
design-build contract is not eliminated but merely redefined.
lustrative of this point is Food Management, Inc. v. Blue Ribbon Beef
Pack, Inc.7 3 In this case, the court ruled that where a general business
corporation had contracted to design, build and initially manage a meat
67. 367 So. 2d at 334. The court further rejected "as specious" the defendant's contention
that the intent of the legislature was to prohibit only natural persons from practicing archi-
tecture without a license. Id. at 334 n.1.
68. It is well settled that professional corporations may offer only those services for which
it has a license to practice. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-548 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
69. E.g., Tidewater Construction Company, Stone and Webster Corporation, Brown and
Root, Inc., Virginia State Board of Professional and Occupational Regulation, File No. 6705
(1975). (The Virginia State Board of Professional and Occupational Regulation is now the
Department of Commerce.)
70. See, id. at 3, Exhibit 4.
71. See, Comment supra note 26.
72. Not only is the distinction between contractor and architect blurred, so is the distinc-
tion between architecture and engineering. See, Dahlem Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of Exam-
iners and Registration of Architects, 459 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970) (though there is
overlap between the practice of architecture and engineering, the state did not intend to
declare all architects to be engineers and vice versa; engineers who formulated aesthetic
design and adapted it to the topography so as to obtain maximum aesthetic effect were not
rendering services "incident to" the practice of engineering). See note 1 supra. But see Ver-
ich v. Florida State Bd. of Architecture, 239 So. 2d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
73. 413 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1969).
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packing plant it had engaged in the unlicensed practice of architecture
and engineering. 74 The defendant contended that it was not engaging in
the practice of architecture or engineering but that it had merely con-
tracted to furnish such services and that all such services had been sub-
contracted to and performed by a partnership duly licensed to provide
such services. The court rejected the defendant's contentions, basing its
decision on the defendant's retention of control over the construction.
The court stated that because the defendants were not merely executing
the plans of the subcontractors but were themselves "in responsible
charge" of the work, they were performing architectural and engineering
services.
7 5
Contrary to this position, a number of other courts have indicated that
supervision of construction does not in and of itself constitute the prac-
tfce of architecture.7 6 Courts which take this position reason that what
the contractor undertakes to do is to act as the agent of the owner and
perform those services which an owner might properly perform on his
own without a license. This position recognizes that at present there is a
division of responsibility for construction supervision between the con-
tractor and the architect and that the contractor's supervisory function
varies greatly from that of the architect.17 When in a position of supervi-
sion, the contractor can make his skill and knowledge of construction
techniques, methods and materials available to the owner. In contrast to
the contractor's supervision is the supervision provided by the architect
which ordinarily consists of checking whether the materials being used
conform to the plans and specifications in kind and quality.7 8
At least two states have recognized this distinction and have made stat-
utory changes accordingly.7 9 In New York and Massachusetts, licensing
statutes now expressly provide that a builder is exempt from state licens-
74. Id. at 718.
75. Id. at 723; Eklund v. Elwell, 116 Utah 521, 211 P.2d 849 (1949) (where licensed agent
is not the responsible party, contractor is not relieved from the requirement of the licensing
statute).
76. See Vereingte Osterreichische Eisen und Stallwerke, A.G. v. Modular Building and
Development Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 1050, 316 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1970); Wahlstrom v. Hill, 213 Wis.
533, 252 N.W. 339 (1934).
77. 213 Wis. at -, 252 N.W. at 340.
78. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
79. N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 7306(g) (McKinney Supp. 1972) provides that "This article shall
not be construed to... prevent... [clontractors or builders from engaging in construction
management and administration of construction contracts."
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112 § 60A (Supp. 1971) provides that "Nothing ... shall be con-
strued to prevent ... the administration of construction contracts by persons customarily
engaged in contracting work."
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ing requirements when he is engaged in the administration of construc-
tion contracts. It is expected that other states will follow.
The final obstacle to the use of design-build contracts is the potential
conflict of interest presented. The traditional model would, on the basis
of this conflict, strongly militate against the use of design-build contracts
as a means to protect the welfare and safety of both the owner and the
public. However, examination of the construction industry in its present
state dismisses this notion for two reasons. First, while protection of the
public's welfare and safety is the basis upon which regulation of construc-
tion is based, that regulation should extend only to the point to insure
that a licensed architect performed those services which the owner could
not provide himself. Regulation should not deprive the contractor or ar-
chitect of the opportunity to supply and derive a profit from those skills
for which he is qualified. Second, if the regulation of construction based
upon the police powers of the state was intended to prevent such activity
and provide a system of checks and balances in order to protect the pub-
lic welfare, such system has proven to be totally inadequate.80 The re-
duced role of the architect, the increased skill and knowledge of the con-
tractor, who should no longer be cast as the adversary of the owner, and
the change in the character and needs of the modem clients all evidence
this inadequacy.
Conflict of interest regulations8 do not provide an effective protective
device for the owner or the public. In Virginia, it requires only that there
be disclosure to the owner of the conflict so that the owner is aware that
the relationship between himself and the architect is not the traditional
one.82 The AIA has recognized the lack of foundation in the conflict of
interest argument and has changed its code of ethics to expressly allow
for member participation in design-build contracts.83
Arguably, the design-build contract offers a much more effective system
of checks and balances which operate to protect the public safety and
welfare. While courts have refused to apply no-fault theories of liability
to architects and contractors under the traditional relationship,8 the de-
sign-build contract puts the performing party in a situation closely analo-
gous to that of the manufacturer. This position lends itself to the applica-
80. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
81. See VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF ARCHITECTS, PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS AND LAN SUR-
vEYORS, RULES AND REGULATIONS, § 23 (1979).
82. Id.
83. AMERICAN INSTrrUTE OF ARCHTrECTs, AIA DoCuMENT J 330-STANDARDS OF ETHICAL
PRACTacE, R.403-405 (1979).
84. E.g., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
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tion of an implied warrahnty theory to the design-build contract."5
IV. CONCLUSION
The traditional model has proved to be an inadequate method of deliv-
ering construction services in an increasing number of situations. While
owners have always been restricted by forces in the marketplace which
affect the cost and availability of financing, labor and material, the in-
creased prominence of institutional owners and their large scale projects
coupled with skyrocketing construction costs has made the feasibility of a
building project dependant more than ever on cost control and fast con-
struction. Speed and efficiency have become as important as aesthetics.
The design-build contract, in many cases, can best supply the needs of
owners because it recognizes the skill and knowledge of the contractor
and utilizes it in the early stages of the building project while providing
single point responsibility. This format allows the architect to partially
return to his role as the "master builder" while simultaneously preventing
a multiplicity of litigation.
The present policy of the Virginia Department of Professional and Oc-
cupational Regulation appears to allow for the use of design-build con-
tracts. This appears only to be an interim policy, based upon anticipated
changes in both statutes and regulations rather than upon interpretation
of current state law. If confronted with the problem under present Vir-
ginia law, it is debatable whether design-build contracts would be de-
clared legal.
Those cases which have allowed design-build contracts have done so
after first finding that the state's statutory scheme allowed for the deliv-
ery of professional architectural services by a non-professional corpora-
tion.86 Such statutes have either expressly stated that the general busi-
ness corporation may engage in such activity"7 or they have stated that so
long as a duly licensed architect is in a responsible management position
in the corporation offering the contract, the contract is legal." Neither of
these statutes exists in the present statutory scheme of Virginia. The
85. See Robertsen Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Coop., 274 Minn. 17, 143 N.W.2d 622
(1966); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
86. See Seaview Hospital, Inc. v. Medicenters of America, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1978). See also Golding v. Schubach Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (1937) (an
unlicensed person who hires a licensed professional to do work at his place of business at a
salary is not thereby engaging in an illegal practice).
87. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
88. See Hattis Associates, Inc. v. Metro Sports Inc., 34 M11. App. 3d 125, 339 N.E.2d 270
(1975); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10 V2 § 3 (1971).
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court, therefore, would have to adopt a rationale similar to that adopted
by the court of appeals in West Baton Rouge,89 finding that the object of
the statutes in question is only to insure that a licensed professional per-
forms those services which an owner may not himself perform. This argu-
ment does not appear to be a strong one, as in West Baton Rouge the
Supreme Court of Louisiana later expressly rejected it in reversing the
court of appeals.
The problem, in terms of Virginia law, is to define more precisely the
services for which a license to practice architecture is required and to cast
those definitions in terms which recognize the existence of and the need
for new systems of construction administration such as those provided
under a design-build contract. At least two states" at present have done
so, expressly providing that a builder is exempt from the architectural
licensing statute when engaged in the administration of construction con-
tracts. It appears that other states will soon follow. The Virginia legisla-
ture should recognize and follow this trend and make the appropriate
statutory changes.
Kevin B. Lynch
89. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
90. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
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